The study “takes an 80-percent replacement rate as the goal, assumes Social Security benefits remain as promised under current law, then calculates the required saving rates for individuals at different earnings levels, at different starting and ending ages, and at different rates of return.” Here’s an example for a 25-year old average earner retiring at the full retirement age (67):

The central message of the study is similar to the message presented in numerous other studies and expert views:

(S)tarting early and working longer are far more effective levers for gaining a secure retirement than earning a higher return. This strategy of saving for a longer period of time is especially effective given the greater risk that comes from attempting to earn that higher return. And the further along an individual is in his career, the more effective working a few years longer becomes.

The study provides added value because it also presents specific target savings rate goals for 401k participants to measure themselves against. Following, for example is the full range of savings rates for medium earnings under varying rates of return and retirement age assumptions:

Even the most liberal assumptions used in the study for a medium earner (i.e. age start contributing at 25, retire at 70 and earn 7%) require a 3% retirement savings rate to achieve the 80% replacement ration. Sadly, many people are not even setting aside this much for retirement.

The complete study is available for free download by clicking here. It is well worth reading and using to measure the adequacy of your personal savings rate.

1. How Much to Save for a Secure Retirement, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (CRR

Conventional wisdom holds that retirees will need about 80% of their pre-retirement income in order to maintain their lifestyles. ¹

For most, Social Security can be expected to provide a large chunk of that 80% — but just how much?

Some answers come from the The 2010 Annual Report Of The Board Of Trustees Of The Federal Old-Age And Survivors Insurance And Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds. This is the annual report card for the Social Security system covering nearly 250 pages and packed with detailed charts, tables and financial statistics. One table in particular provides useful insights into the amount of pre-retirement you can expect Social Security to replace in the years ahead.

Social Security, Medicare and Government Pensions: Get the Most Out of Your Retirement and Medical Benefits (Social Security, Medicare & Government Pensions)

Click to View Product Details

$19.60

As you can see, Social Security can be expected to replace one-half or more of pre-retirement income for workers having relatively low earnings over the course of their careers. As career earnings increase, Social Security replaces a smaller portion of retirement income meaning that these workers need to rely more on 401k’s, other retirement savings and, increasingly more likely, continued employment in order to achieve the 80% replacement goal.

1. There is much debate over whether 80% overstates or understates income needs in retirement. One study by Georgia State University researchers shows needed replacement rates ranging from 78% for two-earner, higher income couples to 94% for two-earner, lower income couples. For this discussion, we can assume 80% is an overall accurate income replacement target.

There are several “limits” that apply to 401k plans under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The limits are found in various sections of the IRC. 401k plans must comply with the various IRC limits to maintain tax-qualified status. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) annually increases 401k plan limits to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Often, adjustments are made only if the change in the limit attributable to the CPI exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., $1,000 or $5,000).

The applicable cost-of-living index was increased for the 2012 tax year, by statute some of the limits were adjusted and others remain unchanged. The table below presents key limits for 2012 and compares them with the 2011 and 2010 limits. Brief descriptions of the various limits are also provided.

2012 401k Limits

The complete text of the IRS news release announcing these changes follows:

WASHINGTON — The Internal Revenue Service today announced cost of living adjustments affecting dollar limitations for pension plans and other retirement-related items for Tax Year 2012. In general, many of the pension plan limitations will change for 2012 because the increase in the cost-of-living index met the statutory thresholds that trigger their adjustment. However, other limitations will remain unchanged. Highlights include:

• The elective deferral (contribution) limit for employees who participate in 401(k), 403(b), most 457 plans, and the federal government’s Thrift Savings Plan is increased from $16,500 to $17,000.
• The catch-up contribution limit for those aged 50 and over remains unchanged at $5,500.
• The deduction for taxpayers making contributions to a traditional IRA is phased out for singles and heads of household who are covered by a workplace retirement plan and have modified adjusted gross incomes (AGI) between $58,000 and $68,000, up from $56,000 and $66,000 in 2011. For married couples filing jointly, in which the spouse who makes the IRA contribution is covered by a workplace retirement plan, the income phase-out range is $92,000 to $112,000, up from $90,000 to $110,000. For an IRA contributor who is not covered by a workplace retirement plan and is married to someone who is covered, the deduction is phased out if the couple’s income is between $173,000 and $183,000, up from $169,000 and $179,000.
• The AGI phase-out range for taxpayers making contributions to a Roth IRA is $173,000 to $183,000 for married couples filing jointly, up from $169,000 to $179,000 in 2011. For singles and heads of household, the income phase-out range is $110,000 to $125,000, up from $107,000 to $122,000. For a married individual filing a separate return who is covered by a retirement plan at work, the phase-out range remains $0 to $10,000.
• The AGI limit for the saver’s credit (also known as the retirement savings contributions credit) for low-and moderate-income workers is $57,500 for married couples filing jointly, up from $56,500 in 2011; $43,125 for heads of household, up from $42,375; and $28,750 for married individuals filing separately and for singles, up from $28,250.

Below are details on both the unchanged and adjusted limitations.

Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for dollar limitations on benefits and contributions under qualified retirement plans. Section 415(d) requires that the Commissioner annually adjust these limits for cost of living increases. Other limitations applicable to deferred compensation plans are also affected by these adjustments under Section 415. Under Section 415(d), the adjustments are to be made pursuant to adjustment procedures which are similar to those used to adjust benefit amounts under Section 215(i)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act.

The limitations that are adjusted by reference to Section 415(d) generally will change for 2012 because the increase in the cost-of-living index met the statutory thresholds that trigger their adjustment. For example, the limitation under Section 402(g)(1) on the exclusion for elective deferrals described in Section 402(g)(3) will increase from $16,500 to $17,000 for 2012. This limitation affects elective deferrals to Section 401(k) plans, Section 403(b) plans, and the Federal Government’s Thrift Savings Plan.

Effective January 1, 2012, the limitation on the annual benefit under a defined benefit plan under section 415(b)(1)(A) is increased from $195,000 to $200,000.

Under section 1.415(d)-1(a)(2)(ii) of the Income Tax Regulations, the adjustment to the limitation under a defined benefit plan under section 415(b)(1)(B) is determined using a special rule. This special rule takes into account the following recent history of changes in the cost-of-living indexes: (1) the cost-of-living index for the quarter ended September 30, 2009, was less than the cost-of-living index for the quarter ended September 30, 2008; (2) the cost-of-living index for the quarter ended September 30, 2010, was greater than the cost-of-living index for the quarter ended September 30, 2009, but less than the cost-of-living index for the quarter ended September 30, 2008; and (3) the cost-of-living index for the quarter ended September 30, 2011, was greater than the cost-of-living indexes for all prior periods.

For a participant who separated from service before January 1, 2010, the limitation under a defined benefit plan under Section 415(b)(1)(B) for 2012 is computed by multiplying the participant’s 2011 compensation limitation by 1.0327 in order to reflect changes in the cost-of-living index from the quarter ended September 30, 2008, to the quarter ended September 30, 2011. For a participant who separated from service during 2010 or 2011, the limitation under a defined benefit plan under Section 415(b)(1)(B) for 2012 is computed by multiplying the participant’s 2011 compensation limitation by 1.0376 in order to reflect changes in the cost-of-living index from the quarter ended September 30, 2010, to the quarter ended September 30, 2011.

The limitation for defined contribution plans under Section 415(c)(1)(A) is increased in 2012 from $49,000 to $50,000.

The Code provides that various other dollar amounts are to be adjusted at the same time and in the same manner as the dollar limitation of Section 415(b)(1)(A). After taking into account the applicable rounding rules, the amounts for 2012 are as follows:

The limitation under Section 402(g)(1) on the exclusion for elective deferrals described in Section 402(g)(3) is increased from $16,500 to $17,000.

The annual compensation limit under Sections 401(a)(17), 404(l), 408(k)(3)(C), and 408(k)(6)(D)(ii) is increased from $245,000 to $250,000.

The dollar limitation under Section 416(i)(1)(A)(i) concerning the definition of key employee in a top-heavy plan is increased from $160,000 to $165,000.

The dollar amount under Section 409(o)(1)(C)(ii) for determining the maximum account balance in an employee stock ownership plan subject to a 5 year distribution period is increased from $985,000 to $1,015,000, while the dollar amount used to determine the lengthening of the 5 year distribution period is increased from $195,000 to $200,000.

The limitation used in the definition of highly compensated employee under Section 414(q)(1)(B) is increased from $110,000 to $115,000.

The dollar limitation under Section 414(v)(2)(B)(i) for catch-up contributions to an applicable employer plan other than a plan described in Section 401(k)(11) or Section 408(p) for individuals aged 50 or over remains unchanged at $5,500. The dollar limitation under Section 414(v)(2)(B)(ii) for catch-up contributions to an applicable employer plan described in Section 401(k)(11) or Section 408(p) for individuals aged 50 or over remains unchanged at $2,500.

The annual compensation limitation under Section 401(a)(17) for eligible participants in certain governmental plans that, under the plan as in effect on July 1, 1993, allowed cost of living adjustments to the compensation limitation under the plan under Section 401(a)(17) to be taken into account, is increased from $360,000 to $375,000.

The compensation amount under Section 408(k)(2)(C) regarding simplified employee pensions (SEPs) remains unchanged at $550.

The limitation under Section 408(p)(2)(E) regarding SIMPLE retirement accounts remains unchanged at $11,500.

The limitation on deferrals under Section 457(e)(15) concerning deferred compensation plans of state and local governments and tax-exempt organizations is increased from $16,500 to $17,000.

The compensation amounts under Section 1.61 21(f)(5)(i) of the Income Tax Regulations concerning the definition of “control employee” for fringe benefit valuation purposes is increased from $95,000 to $100,000. The compensation amount under Section 1.61 21(f)(5)(iii) is increased from $195,000 to $205,000.

The Code also provides that several pension-related amounts are to be adjusted using the cost-of-living adjustment under Section 1(f)(3). After taking the applicable rounding rules into account, the amounts for 2012 are as follows:

The adjusted gross income limitation under Section 25B(b)(1)(A) for determining the retirement savings contribution credit for married taxpayers filing a joint return is increased from $34,000 to $34,500; the limitation under Section 25B(b)(1)(B) is increased from $36,500 to $37,500; and the limitation under Sections 25B(b)(1)(C) and 25B(b)(1)(D), is increased from $56,500 to $57,500.

The adjusted gross income limitation under Section 25B(b)(1)(A) for determining the retirement savings contribution credit for taxpayers filing as head of household is increased from $25,500 to $25,875; the limitation under Section 25B(b)(1)(B) is increased from $27,375 to $28,125; and the limitation under Sections 25B(b)(1)(C) and 25B(b)(1)(D), is increased from $42,375 to $43,125.

The adjusted gross income limitation under Section 25B(b)(1)(A) for determining the retirement savings contribution credit for all other taxpayers is increased from $17,000 to $17,250; the limitation under Section 25B(b)(1)(B) is increased from $18,250 to $18,750; and the limitation under Sections 25B(b)(1)(C) and 25B(b)(1)(D), is increased from $28,250 to $28,750.

The deductible amount under § 219(b)(5)(A) for an individual making qualified retirement contributions remains unchanged at $5,000.

The applicable dollar amount under Section 219(g)(3)(B)(i) for determining the deductible amount of an IRA contribution for taxpayers who are active participants filing a joint return or as a qualifying widow(er) is increased from $90,000 to $92,000. The applicable dollar amount under Section 219(g)(3)(B)(ii) for all other taxpayers (other than married taxpayers filing separate returns) is increased from $56,000 to $58,000. The applicable dollar amount under Section 219(g)(7)(A) for a taxpayer who is not an active participant but whose spouse is an active participant is increased from $169,000 to $173,000.

The adjusted gross income limitation under Section 408A(c)(3)(C)(ii)(I) for determining the maximum Roth IRA contribution for married taxpayers filing a joint return or for taxpayers filing as a qualifying widow(er) is increased from $169,000 to $173,000. The adjusted gross income limitation under Section 408A(c)(3)(C)(ii)(II) for all other taxpayers (other than married taxpayers filing separate returns) is increased from $107,000 to $110,000.

The dollar amount under Section 430(c)(7)(D)(i)(II) used to determine excess employee compensation with respect to a single-employer defined benefit pension plan for which the special election under section 430(c)(2)(D) has been made is increased from $1,014,000 to $1,039,000.

There are several “limits” that apply to 401k plans under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The limits are found in various sections of the IRC. 401k plans must comply with the various IRC limits to maintain tax-qualified status. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) annually increases 401k plan limits to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Often, adjustments are made only if the change in the limit attributable to the CPI exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., $1,000 or $5,000).

The table below shows the primary 401k plan limits in effect for 2011 and 2010. Brief descriptions of the various limits are also provided.

Imported Table

Target Date Funds (also known as life-cycle funds) are designed to make investing for retirement more convenient by automatically changing your investment mix or asset allocation over time. Asset allocation involves dividing an investment portfolio among different asset categories, such as stocks, bonds, and cash investments. Once you select a target date fund, the professional investment managers of the fund make all the decisions about asset allocation. Target date funds are aimed primarily at 401k investors who are not sophisticated about investing, but nonetheless are fully responsible for growing their 401k’s into a retirement nest egg. Rather than trying to figure out how to allocate and re-balance savings between investment categories, target date funds focus on a specific end date (such as the year you reach retirement age). Investments are progressively rebalanced for you from aggressive/riskier investments to conservative/safer vehicles as you near retirement.

The following sample shows how a target date fund may change the mix of investments (stock, bonds, cash) over time. As target retirement date nears, the investment mix becomes less risky. This sample highlights a target date fund that carries the investor “through” retirement target date, rather than “to” the target retirement date.

The Wall Street Journal lists these 5 questions that 401k investors should ask about the target date fund they are considering before investing:

• What Is the Fund’s ‘Glide Path’?
• Is the Fund Intended to Get Investors ‘to’ or ‘Through’ Retirement?
• How Much Does This Fund Cost?
• Does This Fund Take a Strategic or Tactical Asset-Allocation Approach?
• Is the Fund’s Portfolio Diversified Beyond — and Within — Stocks and Bonds?

Target dates vary widely in their investment approach and goals. It is important that the 401k investor learn about the target date fund by reading fund literature and asking questions like the ones shown above. The Department of Labor (DOL) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently published very helpful information bulletin on target date funds.

We are big fans of keeping things simple whenever possible with easy to understand rules of thumb. That’s why we were pleased to see a new report from Hewitt Associates that includes some well researched guideposts for retirement planning. Based on analysis of the retirement needs of 2.1 million employees at 84 large companies, the study finds that for employees who currently contribute to their employers retirement plan:

• on average will need to accumulate a retirement resources equal to 15.7 times times their pay at retirement to maintain pre-retirement living standards (e.g. $785k for a $50k salary)
• Social Security will provide, on average, retirement resources equal to 4.7 times pay
• other retirement savings – such as 401k’s and DB pensions – will need to provide the remaining 11 time pay
• only about 18% of these employees are presently expected to satisfy 100% of their needs at retirement
• on average, workers who rely solely on a defined contribution plan to fund their retirement are projected to meet just 74% of their needs in retirement

Next time you ponder the question: How Much Should I be Saving for Retirement?, keep in mind the 15.7 factor. It’s a well-researched yet simple way to target the retirement nestegg you need to work towards accumulating.

in·er·tia [in-ur-shuh, ih-nur-] –noun

1. inertness, esp. with regard to effort, motion, action, and the like; inactivity; sluggishness.
2. Physics. the property of matter by which it retains its state of rest or its velocity along a straight line so long as it is not acted upon by an external force.
3. Medicine/Medical. lack of activity, esp. as applied to a uterus during childbirth when its contractions have decreased or stopped.

As 401k participants everywhere ponder “What should I do with my 401k in this current market” they may want to give some thought to the beneficial aspects of inertia.

Synonymous with “inactivity” and “sluggishness”, inertia is typically viewed as a negative characteristic in the 401k world. Indeed, the push by government and the 401k industry to make 401k’s a truly workable retirement solution has centered on introducing policies specifically designed to counter what we can call “bad” inertia. Examples:

But there apparently is a bright side to 401k inertia as well. Some commentators credit employee inaction in the face of the historic market collapse of 2008-09 as the primary reason behind the remarkable recovery of 401k account balances that has occurred in the past year. Relatively few 401k participants reacted to the market turmoil by reducing their 401k contributions or moving account balances from riskier asset classes that were hardest hit into “safer” investments. Doing so, of course, would have been the classic panicked behavior expected of amateur investors: selling at exactly the wrong time.

401k participants who were guilty of inertia in the last year have been rewarded.

For whatever reasons, workers by and large stood pat with their 401k’s and were rewarded nicely. By the end of 2009, just 9 months after the market bottomed (DJIA @ 6,443 in March 2009) Fidelity and Vanguard both were reporting that most 401k participants had account balances higher than they did at the market’s peak in October 2007.

“I think the good news is inertia took over and most people did nothing. During the rebound from April (2009) on, the inertia value of the 401k is very good.”
- Jane Bryant Quinn as quoted in Employee Benefit News (4/1/2010)

“What to do with my 401k in this current market?” Consider setting a long-term course with regular 401k contributions, a solid 401k investment portfolio strategy and letting inertia take over from there.

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The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) periodically publishes independent in-depth studies of issues of importance to the 401k planning community. These studies are available for free download to anyone. We provide here summaries of several recent 401k GAO studies that are worth reading:

• Income Security: Older Adults and the 2007-2009 Recession
• Private Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an Uneven Distribution of Benefits
• Defined Contribution Plans: Key Information on Target Date Funds as Default Investments Should Be Provided to Plan Sponsors and Participants
• 401(k) Plans: Several Factors Can Diminish Retirement Savings, but Automatic Enrollment Shows Promise for Increasing Participation and Savings
• Retirement Savings: Better Information and Sponsor Guidance Could Improve Oversight and Reduce Fees for Participants
• 401(k) Plans: Policy Changes Could Reduce the Long-term Effects of Leakage on Workers’ Retirement Savings
• Fulfilling Fiduciary Obligations Can Present Challenges for 401(k) Plan Sponsors
• Information That Sponsors and Participants Need to Understand 401(k) Plan Fees
• 401(k) Plan Participants and Sponsors Need Better Information on Fees

(1) Since 2007, unemployment rates doubled and remained higher than before the recession for workers aged 55 and older. While these rates were not as high as for other age groups, of more concern is that once older workers lose their jobs they are less likely to find other employment. In fact, the median duration of unemployment for older workers rose sharply from 2007 to 2010, more than tripling for workers 65 and older and increasing to 31 weeks from 11 weeks for workers aged 55 to 64. In addition, the proportion of older part-time workers who indicated they would prefer full-time work nearly doubled during this time. Unemployment rates increased for all groups during the recession and remained lowest for whites. (2) Household income fell by 6 percent for adults aged 55 to 64, but increased by 5 percent for adults 65 and older. Median household net worth fell during the recession for older adults. Poverty rates increased for adults aged 55 to 64, but declined for those 65 and older, while low incomes were more prevalent in older age groups than in younger ones. In addition, poverty rates were higher than the rates based on official levels when medical costs were factored in. The percentage of adults who began drawing Social Security benefits at age 62 rose during the recession, as did awards of Social Security Disability Benefits and applications for Supplemental Security Income benefits. Food insecurity also rose among older adults during the recession. (3) Medical costs continued to rise faster than other costs, and older adults continued to spend more on medical care than those in younger age groups. The purchasing power of Social Security benefits was maintained with cost-of-living adjustments and, for those receiving benefits in 2009, was increased with a one-time $250 Recovery Act payment in 2009. Mortality rates for older adults continued a long-term decline during 2007 through 2009.

GAO-12-76 October 17, 2011

Full Report (PDF, 10 pages) Accessible Text

Private Pensions: Some Key Features Lead to an Uneven Distribution of Benefits
Despite sizeable tax incentives, private pension participation has remained at about 50 percent of the workforce. For those in a pension plan, there is concern that these incentives accrue primarily to higher income employees and do relatively little to help lower income workers save for retirement. The financial crisis and labor-market downturn may have exacerbated these difficulties. Therefore, we examined (1) recent trends in new private pension plan formation, (2) the characteristics of defined contribution plan participants contributing at or above statutory limits, (3) how suggested options to modify an existing credit for low-income workers might affect their retirement income, and (4) the long-term effects of the recent financial crisis on retirement savings. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed reports, federal regulations, and laws, and interviewed academics, agency officials, and other relevant experts. We also analyzed Department of Labor and 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data, and used a microsimulation model to assess effects of modifying tax incentives for low-income workers. We incorporated technical comments from the departments of Labor and Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as appropriate.

Net new plan formation in recent years has been very small, with the total number of single employer private pension plans increasing about 1 percent from about 697,000 in 2003 to 705,000 in 2007. Although employers created almost 180,000 plans over this period, this formation was largely offset by plan terminations or mergers. About 92 percent of newly formed plans were defined contribution (DC) plans, with the rest being defined benefit (DB) plans. New plans were generally small, with about 96 percent having fewer than 100 participants. Regarding the small percentage of new DB plans, professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, and dentists sponsored about 43 percent of new small DB plans, and more than 55 percent of new DB plan sponsors also sponsored DC plans. The low net growth of private retirement plans is a concern in part because workers without employer-sponsored plans do not benefit as fully from tax incentives as workers that have employer-sponsored plans. Furthermore, the benefits of new DB plans disproportionately benefit workers at a few types of professional firms. Most individuals who contributed at or above the 2007 statutory limits for DC contributions tended to have earnings that were at the 90th percentile ($126,000) or above for all DC participants, according to our analysis of the 2007 SCF. Similarly, consistent with findings from our past work, high-income workers have benefited the most from increases in the limits between 2001 and 2007. Finally, we found that men were about three times as likely as women to make so-called catch-up contributions when DC participants age 50 and older were allowed to contribute an extra $5,000 to their plans. We found that several modifications to the Saver’s Credit–a tax credit for low-income workers who make contributions to a DC plan–could provide a sizeable increase in retirement income for some low wage workers, although this group is small. For example, under our most generous scenario, Saver’s Credit recipients who fell in the lowest earnings quartile experienced a 14 percent increase in annual retirement income from DC savings, on average. The long-term effects of the financial crisis on retirement income are uncertain and will likely vary widely. For those still employed and participating in a plan, the effects are unclear. Data are limited, and while financial markets have recovered much of their losses from 2008, it is not fully known yet how participants will adjust their contributions and asset allocations in response to market volatility in the future. In contrast, although data are again limited, the unemployed, especially the long-term unemployed, may be at risk of experiencing significant declines in retirement income as contributions cease and the probability of drawing down retirement accounts for other needs likely increases. The potential troubling consequences of the financial crisis may be obscuring long standing concerns over the ability of the employer-provided pension system in helping moderate and low-income workers, including those with access to a plan, save enough for retirement.

GAO-11-333 March 30, 2011

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Defined Contribution Plans: Key Information on Target Date Funds as Default Investments Should Be Provided to Plan Sponsors and Participants
To promote the adoption of appropriate default investments by retirement plans that automatically enroll workers, in 2007 the Department of Labor (DOL) identified three qualified default investment alternatives. One of these options–target date funds (TDF)–has emerged as by far the most popular default investment. TDFs are designed to provide an age-appropriate asset allocation for plan participants over time. Because of recent concerns about significant losses in and differences in the performance of some TDFs, GAO was asked address the following questions: (1) To what extent do the investment compositions of TDFs vary; (2) what is known about the performance of TDFs; (3) how do plan sponsors select and monitor TDFs that are chosen as the plan’s default investment, and what steps do they take to communicate information on these funds to their participants; and (4) what steps have DOL and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) taken to ensure that plan sponsors appropriately select and use TDFs? To answer these questions, GAO reviewed available reports and data, and interviewed TDF managers, plan sponsors, relevant federal officials, and others.

Target date funds vary considerably in asset structures and in other ways, largely as a result of the different objectives and investment philosophies of fund managers. In the years approaching the retirement date, for example, some TDFs have a relatively low equity allocation–35 percent or less–so that plan participants will be insulated from excessive losses near retirement. Other TDFs have an equity allocation of 60 percent or more in the belief that relatively high equity returns will help ensure that retirees do not deplete savings in old age. TDFs also vary considerably in other respects, such as in the use of alternative assets and complex investment techniques. In addition, allocations are based in part on assumptions about plan participant actions–such as contribution rates and how plan participants will manage 401(k) assets upon retirement–which may differ from the actions of many participants. These investment differences and differences between assumed and actual participant behavior may have significant implications for the retirement security of plan participants invested in TDFs. Recent TDF performance has varied considerably, and while studies show that many investors will obtain significantly positive returns over the long term, a small percentage of investors may have poor or negative returns. Between 2005 and 2009 annualized TDF returns for the largest funds with 5 years of returns ranged from +28 percent to -31 percent. Although TDFs do not have a long history, studies modeling the potential long-term performance of TDFs show that TDFs investment returns may vary greatly. For example, while one study found that the mean rate of return for all individual participants was +4.3 percent, some participant groups could experience significantly lower returns. These studies also found that different ratios of investments affect the range of TDF investment returns and offer various trade-offs. While some plan sponsors conduct robust TDF selection and monitoring processes, other plan sponsors face challenges in doing so. Plan sponsors and industry experts identified several key considerations in selecting and monitoring TDFs, such as the demographics of participants and the expertise of the plan sponsor. Some plan sponsors may face several challenges in evaluating TDFs, such as having limited resources to conduct a thorough selection process, or lacking a benchmark to meaningfully measure performance. Although plan sponsors may use various media in an effort to inform participants about funds offered through the plan, some plan sponsors and others noted that participants typically understand little about TDFs. DOL and SEC have taken important steps to improve TDF disclosures, participant education, and guidance for plan sponsors and participants. For example, both agencies have proposed regulations aimed at helping to ensure that investors and participants are aware of the possibility of investment losses and have clear information about TDF asset allocations. However, we found that DOL could take additional steps to better promote more careful and thorough plan sponsor selection of TDFs as default investments, and help plan participants understand the relevance of TDF assumptions about contributions and withdrawals. GAO recommends that DOL take actions to assist plan sponsors in selecting TDFs to best suit their employees, and to ensure that plan participants have access to essential information about TDFs. DOL raised a number of issues with our recommendations, and we amended one of them in response to their comments.

GAO-11-118 January 31, 2011

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401(k) Plans: Several Factors Can Diminish Retirement Savings, but Automatic Enrollment Shows Promise for Increasing Participation and Savings

Over the past 25 years, the number of defined benefit (DB) plans has declined while the number of defined contribution (DC) plans has increased. Today, DC plans are the dominant type of employer-sponsored retirement plans, with more than 49 million U.S. workers participating in them. 401k plans currently cover over 85 percent of active DC plan participants and are the fastest growing type of employer-sponsored pension plan. Given these shifts in pension coverage, workers are increasingly relying on 401k plans for their pension income. Recently, policy makers have focused attention on the ability of 401k plans to provide participants with adequate retirement income and the challenges that arise as 401k plans become the predominant retirement savings plan for employees. As a result, GAO was asked to report on (1) challenges to building and maintaining of savings in 401k plans, and (2) recent measures to improve 401k participation and savings levels.

There are challenges to building and saving through 401k plans. While low participation rates may be due, in part, to the fact that some workers participate in DB plans, there is also a large portion of workers who do not have access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan, as well as some who do not enroll in such a plan when an employer offers it. We found that for those who did participate, their overall balances were low, particularly for low-income and older workers who either did not have the means to save or have not had the opportunity to save in 401k’s for much of their working lifetimes. There are also challenges workers face in maintaining savings in 401k plans. For example, 401k leakage–actions participants take that reduce the savings they have accumulated, such as borrowing from the account, taking hardship withdrawals, or cashing out the account when they change jobs–continues to affect retirement savings and increases the risk that 401k plans may yield insufficient retirement income for individual participants. Further, various fees, such as investment and other hidden fees, can erode retirement savings and individuals may not be aware of their impact. Automatic enrollment of employees in 401k plans is one measure to increase participation rates and saving. Under automatic enrollment, which was encouraged by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and recent regulatory changes, employers enroll workers into plans automatically unless they explicitly choose to opt out. Plan sponsors are increasingly adopting automatic enrollment policies, which can considerably increase participation rates, with some plans’ rates reaching as high as 95 percent. Employers can also set default contribution rates and investment funds. Though target-date funds are a common type of default investment fund, there are concerns about their risks, particularly for participants nearing retirement.

GAO-10-153T October 28, 2009

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Retirement Savings: Better Information and Sponsor Guidance Could Improve Oversight and Reduce Fees for Participants
American workers increasingly rely on defined contribution (DC) plans like 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts (IRA) for retirement income. Together with other DC plans–401(a), 403(b), and 457 plans–these accounts hold about $7.1 trillion. As workers accrue earnings on their investments, they also pay a number of fees that may significantly decrease retirement savings over the course of a career. GAO examined: (1) the types of fees charged to participants and investments of various DC plans; (2) how DC plan sponsor actions affect participant fees; (3) how fee disclosure requirements vary; and (4) the effectiveness of DC plan oversight. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and consulted with experts, federal officials, service providers, and six plan sponsors.

Participants in DC plans and IRAs generally pay the same types of fees, regardless of the plan in which they are enrolled, such as investment management fees. However, participants in some plans are more likely to invest in products that may have higher fees. For example, we found that participants in 403(b) plans and individual IRAs are more likely to invest in products like individual variable annuities or retail mutual funds, which frequently charge more than other investments. According to experts, one reason for the different investments is that many 403(b) plan sponsors do not make group products available to participants. DC plan sponsors generally take certain actions that decrease participants’ fees. Sponsors can help reduce participants’ fees by, for example, offering cheaper investment products in which participants may choose to invest, like low-cost mutual funds. Sponsors may also pool assets to obtain pricing advantages. 401(k) and 401(a) plan sponsors frequently pool participants’ assets to realize lower fees in mutual funds, but sponsors of 403(b) plans often do not. Instead, many 403(b) plan sponsors keep sponsor involvement to a minimum, which limits the opportunities to pool assets and decrease fees. Fee disclosure requirements vary depending on plan regulations and investment regulations. Sponsors of plans subject to Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)–which was enacted in part to protect the interests of employee benefit plan participants–are required to disclose certain documents to participants, which may or may not describe fees. For plans not subject to these laws, such as state and local government plans, some states impose disclosure requirements, and some do not. Fee disclosure requirements also vary based on the type of investment product in which participants invest. The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates some investment products, like mutual funds, while others are regulated by states’ insurance agencies. Because different regulators require different disclosures, participants in DC plans and IRAs can invest in similar products but receive different information on fees. Labor oversees disclosure for participants of certain DC plans, while IRS oversees tax laws that underlie all DC plans, but both lack information that could strengthen oversight. Labor is responsible for enforcing requirements for disclosure–which may include fees–and the requirement that fiduciaries for some plans must ensure reasonable fees, and has proposed regulations to improve fee disclosure. However, Labor does not have the specific authority to collect information to help ensure that sponsors of certain 403(b) plans continue to protect participants’ interests. While IRS does not oversee fees or fee disclosure, IRS oversees DC plans’ compliance with the tax code. IRS does not collect information to easily enforce 457(b) plans’ contribution limits and detect violations that may reduce federal tax revenue. In addition, IRS and other regulators do not routinely share information with one another to use resources effectively and help enforce a rule requiring reasonable fees.

GAO-09-641 September 4, 2009

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401(k) Plans: Policy Changes Could Reduce the Long-term Effects of Leakage on Workers’ Retirement Savings
Under federal regulations, 401(k) participants may tap into their accrued retirement savings before retirement under certain circumstances, including hardship. This “leakage” from 401(k) accounts can result in a permanent loss of retirement savings. GAO was asked to analyze (1) the incidence, amount, and relative significance of the different forms of 401(k) leakage; (2) how plans inform participants about hardship withdrawal provisions, loan provisions, and options at job separation, including the short- and long-term costs of each; and (3) how various policies may affect the incidence of leakage. To address these matters, GAO analyzed federal and 401(k) industry data and interviewed federal officials, pension experts, and plan administrators responsi- ble for managing the majority of 401(k) participants and assets.

The incidence and amount of the principal forms of leakage from 401(k) plans–that is, cashouts of account balances at job separation that are not rolled over into another retirement account, hardship withdrawals, and loans–have remained relatively steady, with cashouts having the greatest ultimate impact on participants’ retirement preparedness. Approximately 15 percent of participants initiated some form of leakage from their retirement plans, according to an analysis of U.S. Census Bureau survey data collected in 1998, 2003, and 2006. In addition, the incidence and amount of hardship withdrawals and loans changed little through 2008, according to data GAO received from selected major 401(k) plan administrators. Cashouts of 401(k) accounts at job separation can result in the largest amounts of leakage and the greatest proportional loss in retirement savings. Most plans that GAO contacted used plan documents, call centers, and Web sites to inform participants of the short-term costs associated with the various forms of leakage, such as the tax and associated penalties. However, few plans provided them with information on the long-term negative implications that leakage can have on their retirement savings, such as the loss of compounded interest and earnings on the withdrawn amount over the course of a participant’s career. Experts that GAO contacted said that certain provisions had all likely reduced the overall incidence and amount of leakage, including those that imposed a 10 percent tax penalty on most withdrawals taken before age 59?, required participants to exhaust their plan’s loan provisions before taking a hardship withdrawal, and required plan sponsors to preserve the tax-deferred status of accounts with balances of more than $1,000 at job separation. However, experts noted that a provision requiring plans to suspend contributions to participant accounts for 6 months following a hardship withdrawal may exacerbate the long-term effect of leakage by barring otherwise able participants from contributing to their accounts. GAO also found that some plans are not following current hardship rules, which may result in unnecessary leakage.

GAO-09-715 August 28, 2009

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Fulfilling Fiduciary Obligations Can Present Challenges for 401(k) Plan Sponsors
American workers increasingly rely on 401(k) plans for their retirement security, and sponsors of 401(k) plans–typically employers–have critical obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). When acting as fiduciaries, they must act prudently and solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. The Department of Labor (Labor) is responsible for protecting private pension plan participants and beneficiaries by enforcing ERISA. GAO examined: (1) common 401(k) plan features, which typically have important fiduciary implications, and factors affecting these decisions; (2) challenges sponsors face in fulfilling their fiduciary obligations when overseeing plan operations; and (3) actions Labor takes to ensure that sponsors fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and the progress Labor has made on its regulatory initiatives. To address these objectives, GAO administered a survey asking sponsors how they select plan features and oversee operations, reviewed industry research, conducted interviews, and reviewed related documents.

Plan sponsors commonly select certain noninvestment and investment features, and their decisions about which investment features to select generally have important fiduciary implications. According to industry research, most 401(k) plans offer a number of common features, such as employer contributions and loans for employees. Some of these decisions seldom involve fiduciary obligations set by ERISA because they are mainly business decisions related to establishing the plan. However, a sponsor’s decisions about investment features, like the menu of investment options, entail important fiduciary obligations under ERISA. ERISA and its regulations stipulate certain requirements for these investment decisions, like offering diversified funds and prudently selecting and monitoring investment options. Various other factors also affect a sponsor’s menu decisions, including the size of the plan and the role of external advisers and other providers. Plan sponsors face challenges in fulfilling their obligations when fiduciary roles are not clearly defined or when sponsors lack important information about arrangements between service providers. Fiduciary roles that are not clearly defined can lead to gaps in plan oversight. For example, several industry professionals noted situations when sponsors assumed they had delegated fiduciary investment advice for the selection and monitoring of investment funds to a service provider, but the service provider did not acknowledge that fiduciary role. Sponsors also have fiduciary obligations when selecting and monitoring one or more service providers. To fulfill these obligations, Labor’s guidance indicates that sponsors should obtain information about service providers’ compensation arrangements and potential conflicts of interest that could affect the service provider’s performance. Labor and various industry practitioners have proposed new ways to improve fiduciary oversight that may address some of the challenges of unclear fiduciary roles and providers’ arrangements. Labor takes various actions to monitor sponsors’ fiduciary oversight of 401(k) plans and has made some progress on its regulatory initiatives. Labor’s actions include investigating reports of questionable 401(k) plan practices, collecting information from plan sponsors, and conducting outreach to educate plan sponsors about their responsibilities. Labor is also proceeding with several initiatives to improve disclosures to participants, plan sponsors, government agencies and the public. For example, Labor recently published a proposed rule on the information that service providers must disclose to plan sponsors but is trying to resolve several questions before issuing a final rule. In addition, certain matters that GAO has asked Congress to consider would help Labor in its efforts to improve sponsors’ fiduciary oversight. We previously suggested that Congress amend ERISA to (1) explicitly require 401(k) service providers to disclose to plan sponsors the compensation they receive from other service providers and (2) give Labor authority to recover plan losses against certain types of service providers even if they are not currently considered fiduciaries under ERISA.

GAO-08-774 July 16, 2008

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Information That Sponsors and Participants Need to Understand 401(k) Plan Fees

Employers are increasingly moving away from traditional pension plans to what has become the most dominant and fastest growing type of plan, the 401(k). For 401(k) plan sponsors, understanding the fees being charged helps fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest of plan participants. Participants should consider fees as well as the historical performance and investment risk for each plan option when investing in a 401(k) plan because fees can significantly decrease retirement savings over the course of a career. GAO’s prior work found that information on 401(k) fees is limited. GAO previously made recommendations to both Congress and the Department of Labor (Labor) on ways to improve the disclosure of fee information to plan participants and sponsors and reporting of fee information by sponsors to Labor. Both Labor and Congress now have efforts under way to ensure that both participants and sponsors receive the necessary fee information to make informed decisions. These efforts on the subject have generated significant debate. This testimony provides information on 401(k) plan fees that (1) sponsors need to carry out their responsibilities to the plan and (2) plan participants need to make informed investment decisions. To complete this statement, GAO relied on previous work and additional information from Labor and industry professionals regarding information about plan fees.

Information on 401(k) plan fee disclosure serves different functions for plan sponsors and participants. Plan sponsors need to understand a broad range of information on expenses associated with their plans to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. Sponsors need information on expenses associated with the investment options that they offer to participants and the providers they hire to perform plan services. Such information would help them meet their fiduciary duty to determine if expenses are reasonable for the services provided. In addition, sponsors also need to understand the implication of certain business arrangements between service providers, such as revenue sharing. Despite some disagreements about how much information is needed, industry professionals have made various suggestions to help plan sponsors collect meaningful information on expenses. Labor has also undertaken a number of activities related to the information on plan fees that sponsors should consider. Participants need fee information to make informed decisions about their investments–primarily, whether to contribute to the plan and how to allocate their contributions among the investment options the plan sponsor has selected. However, many participants are not aware that they pay any fees, and those who are may not know how much they are paying. Most industry professionals agree that information about an investment option’s relative risk, its historic performance, and the associated fees is fundamental for plan participants. Some industry professionals also believe that other fees that are also charged to participants should be understood, so that participants can clearly see the effect these fees can have on their account balances.

GAO-08-222T October 30, 2007

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401(k) Plan Participants and Sponsors Need Better Information on Fees
According to Labor’s most recent data, there are an estimated 44 million active participants in 401(k) plans. As participants accrue earnings on their investments, they also pay a number of fees, associated with 401(k) plans. Over the course of the employee’s career, fees may significantly decrease retirement account balances. For plan sponsors, understanding the fees they are being charged helps fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest of plan participants. GAO’s prior work on 401(k) fees found that fee disclosures are limited and do not allow an easy comparison of investment options. GAO previously made recommendations to both Congress and Labor on ways to improve the disclosure of fee information to both plan participants and sponsors. Both Labor and Congress now have efforts under way to ensure that both participants and sponsors receive the necessary fee information to make informed decisions. These efforts on the subject have generated significant debate. This testimony provides information about the way fee information could be disclosed to benefit 401(k) participants and sponsors, focusing on 1) the information on fees that could be most useful for plan participants and plan sponsors and 2) how such information could be effectively presented. To complete this statement, GAO relied on previous work and also utilized information from Labor and from industry experts on the subject of fee disclosure to participants.

Fee disclosure serves different functions for plan participants and sponsors. Studies have shown that 401(k) participants often lack basic knowledge about the fees associated with their plan. Participants need information about the direct expenses that could be charged to their accounts. As we previously recommended and most experts agree, the expense ratio–a fund’s operating fees as a percentage of its assets–is a fundamental piece of information for participants. Plan sponsors, in contrast, need a range of fee information to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities. Sponsors need additional information on service providers, investment options, and revenue sharing arrangements to assist them in monitoring plan fees and determining whether they continue to be reasonable in light of the services provided. Labor has ongoing efforts designed to help participants and plan sponsors understand the importance of plan fees and the effect of those fees on retirement savings. Whether participants receive only basic expense ratio information or more detailed information on fees, presenting the information in a clear, easily comparable format can help participants understand the content of the disclosure. GAO’s prior reports found that certain practices help people understand complicated information. For example, using clear language and a straightforward layout in a brief document can enhance the accessibility of financial information. Also, providing graphics and less text can both attract recipient attention and make detailed information more quickly and easily understandable.

GAO-08-95T October 24, 2007

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But a just released study from Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research reaches a surprising conclusion: Even taking into account the massive losses brought about by the financial crisis, when viewed from a career-spanning perspective, early baby-boomers (those closest to retirement) have fared quite well in terms of financial market returns. The study looks at 401k investment returns over the careers of three hypothetical retirement savers:

• Early Boomers (age 50 in 1999)
• Late Boomers (age 40 in 1999)
• Gen Xers (age 30 in 1999)

The early boomer turned 60 in 2009 and was preparing for retirement just as markets hit bottom in March of that year. These workers – and their decimated retirement nest eggs – were the subject of countless stories highlighting the shortcomings of the 401k. How was it possible for someone to work and save diligently over an entire career only to have the rug pulled out from beneath them on the doorstep of retirement?

Even at the low point, early baby boomers realized 7.9% career market rates of return. More recently, as markets are recovering, career return rates exceed 9%.

But as devastating as the crisis has been, it is amazing to realize that even at the lowest point (March 2009) the career-long rate of return for an early boomer 401k saver was +7.9%! This is because these workers were old enough to benefit fully from the historic run-up in the stock market that occurred between 1982 and 2000. Late Boomers and Gen Xers, on the other hand, had to deal with precipitous market declines in 2000 and 2008 without the benefit of the 80′s market boom.

None of this is to suggest that early boomers’ retirement plans weren’t tragically impacted by the 2008-09 financial crisis. They certainly were and, unlike younger generations, they do not have time to recoup losses. Moreover, percentages and rates of return mask the more fundamental problem that, by every measure, workers across all age cohorts have not (and are not) adequately saving for retirement. A healthy rate of return on a pint-sized nest-egg is not a formula for retirement success.

“As jarring as the financial collapse may have been for the Early Boomers, the market has actually treated them well over their lifetime. Hypothetical workers investing either all in equities or in half equities and half bonds have enjoyed fairly high returns compared with long-run averages. This agreeable outcome is the result of these workers having substantial assets during the long bull market that began in 1982 and ended in 2000.

Moreover, the market has treated Early Boomers a lot better than the subsequent cohorts. Late Boomers and Gen Xers never benefited fully from the 1982-2000 bull market and were hard hit by two market collapses. The Late Boomers are the most vulnerable, as they would need substantial returns in the future to end up with the same ratio of assets to income at age 60 currently enjoyed by Early Boomers.”¹

1. Returns on 401k Assets by Cohort, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, March 2010.

The Senators’ Lifetime Income Disclosure Act (S. 2832) would require 401(k) plan sponsors to inform participating workers of the projected monthly income they could expect at retirement based on their current account balance. The measure is patterned on the Social Security Administration’s annual statements, which are mailed annually to working Americans to inform them of estimated monthly benefits based on their current earnings. Congress mandated annual Social Security statements in 1989, and they have proven to be very useful to workers in preparing for retirement.

By providing similar information for 401(k) plans, the Lifetime Income Disclosure Act would give American workers a more complete snapshot of their projected income in retirement.

Specifically, under the Act, defined contribution plans subject to ERISA – including 401(k) plans – would be required annually to inform participants of how the account balance would translate into guaranteed monthly payments – a “retirement paycheck for life” – based on age at retirement and other factors.

To ensure there is no material burden or potential liability on employers who voluntarily sponsor 401 (k) plans, the legislation directs the Department of Labor issue tables that employers may use in calculating an annuity equivalent, as well as a model disclosure. Employers and service providers using the model disclosure and following the prescribed assumptions and DOL rules would be insulated from liability.

As far as Congressional bills go, the Lifetime Income Disclosure Act is relatively simple and straightforward – only six wide-margin, double-spaced pages in length. The heart of the bill is comprised of three sections setting forth the type of lifetime income disclosures to be made:

1. DISCLOSURE — A lifetime income disclosure shall set forth the annuity equivalent of the total benefits accrued with respect to the participant or beneficiary.



2. ANNUITY EQUIVALENT OF THE TOTAL BENEFITS ACCRUED — For purposes of this subparagraph, the ‘annuity equivalent of the total benefits accrued’ means the amount of monthly payments the participant or beneficiary would receive at the plan’s normal retirement age if the total accrued benefits of such participant or beneficiary were used on the date of the lifetime income disclosure to purchase the life annuities described in subclause (III), with payments under such annuities commencing at the plan’s normal retirement age.
3. LIFE ANNUITIES.—The life annuities described in this subclause are a qualified joint and survivor annuity (as defined in section 205(d)), based on assumptions specified in rules prescribed by the Secretary, including the assumption that the participant or beneficiary has a spouse of equal age, and a single life annuity. Such annuities may have a term certain or other features to the extent permitted under rules prescribed by the Secretary.

Details concerning the assumptions to be used and implementation rules are left for the Labor Department to determine.

With the transition from defined benefit pensions to 401k’s, Americans have been forced to assume greater responsibility for their own retirement funding. Too many are ill-prepared for the task. If the defined contribution retirement model is to succeed, it is critical that workers be better educated on retirement issues and provided good information on which they can base their savings decisions. Senate Bill 2832 appears to provide a low-cost, common-sense way to greatly improve 401k planning.